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Recently, a number of philosophers  of biology (e.g., Matthen and Ariew 2002; Walsh, 
Lewens, and Ariew 2002; Pigliucci and Kaplan 2006; Walsh 2007) have endorsed views about 
random drift that, we will argue, rest on an implicit assumption that the meaning of concepts 
such as  drift can be understood through an examination of the mathematical models  in 
which drift appears.  They also seem to implicitly assume that ontological questions about the 
causality (or lack thereof) of terms  appearing in the models  can be gleaned from the models 
alone.  We will question these general assumptions  by showing how the same equation – the 
simple (p + q)2 = p2 + 2pq + q2 – can be given radically different interpretations, one of 
which is  a physical, causal process  and one of which is  not.  This  shows that mathematical 
models  on their own yield neither interpretations nor ontological conclusions.  Instead, we 
argue that these issues can only be resolved by considering the phenomena that the models 
were originally designed to represent and the phenomena to which the models are currently 
applied.  When one does  take those factors  into account, starting with the motivation for 
Sewall Wright’s  and R.A. Fisher’s  early drift models  and ending with contemporary 
applications, a very different picture of the concept of drift emerges.  On this  view, drift is  a 
term for a set of physical processes, namely, indiscriminate sampling processes  (Beatty 1984; 
Hodge 1987; Millstein 2002, 2005). 
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Introduction
	 Consider the following account of  drift:
Drift, in any of its  forms, is  a statistical property of an ensemble of trials or events: drift is  statistical 
error. A series  of births, survivals, deaths, and reproductions manifests  drift just if the outcome—
measured as  changes  in trait frequencies—diverges  from that predicted by differences  in fitness 
(Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew 2002: 459).
This defines  drift purely in terms of its  outcome, namely, in terms of the deviation of the actual outcome from 
fitness expectations. In other words, if in a given generation the proportions of types  in a population exactly 
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match those expected from the fitness  values  of the different types in the population, then on this view, there 
is  no drift.  Of course, there will usually be some deviation, and thus  some drift, given that all real 
populations  are finite.  But that's  just a mathematical consequence, in the same way that one may flip a fair 
coin ten times  without obtaining half heads. Thus  on this  view, nothing physical is  happening here; there is 
no physical process of drift. We shall call this  the Drift as  Outcome Alone (DOA) definition.  Others  works 
endorse DOA; see, e.g., Matthen and Ariew (2002); Pigliucci and Kaplan (2006); and Walsh (2007). 
Plutynski (2007) is sympathetic, but falls short of  endorsement.
	 On our view, the DOA conception of drift rests  on an implicit assumption that the concept of drift is  to 
be understood solely through an examination of the mathematical models  in which drift appears. Indeed, 
the DOA view seems to assume that questions about the causality (or lack thereof) of drift can be gleaned 
from the models  alone. We think this  view is  mistaken. We will argue that an examination of the 
mathematical models of drift alone cannot yield a proper understanding of drift because: 1) the same 
mathematical model can give rise to more than one interpretation; moreover, there are different drift models 
to consider, and 2) a proper interpretation of drift is informed by historical and contemporary biological 
practice; DOA is not.
 Ultimately, correctly interpreting mathematical models  of drift by relating the models  to the physical 
systems being modeled results  in a conception of drift as  an indiscriminate sampling process (Beatty 1984), 
i.e., a physical process where heritable physical differences  between entities  are causally irrelevant to 
differences in reproductive success  (Millstein 2002, 2005; see also Hodge 1987). Entities that can be 
indiscriminately sampled include, but are not limited to, “parents” (i.e., organisms) and gametes; Beatty 
(1984) dubs  the former “indiscriminate parent sampling” and the latter “indiscriminate gamete sampling.” 
Or so we will argue. We begin with a very brief review of common conceptualizations  of drift among 
biologists and philosophers.
Common conceptualizations of  drift among biologists and philosophers
 DOA is  not the most common conceptualization of drift among biologists; biologists  typically describe 
drift as  an indiscriminate sampling process  leading to a certain type of outcome. That is, biologists  typically 
define drift not as  outcome alone, but rather, process  and outcome together, as  the following examples 
illustrate (Hartl and Clark (1996) may be an exception here; they seem to describe drift as  a process  alone). 
The indiscriminate sampling process  that is  described most often is  indiscriminate gamete sampling, 
although other biological phenomena such as  indiscriminate parent sampling, indiscriminate founding 
events (also known as the “founder effect” or “founder principle”), and indiscriminate bottleneck events  are 
also often described as forms of  drift (all of  which are forms of  indiscriminate sampling).
	 At first glance, Futuyma provides a description of drift that sounds  similar to the DOA account: he says 
that drift occurs as  a consequence of small population size and compares  drift to tossing a coin a small 
number of times  (2005: 196), as  DOA proponents  do. However, in his  chapter focusing on drift, Futuyma 
makes it clear that drift involves indiscriminate gamete sampling:
…the frequency of an allele can change…because one or few copies  of the… allele may happen not 
to be included in those gametes  that unite into zygotes, or may happen not to be carried by the 
offspring that survive to reproductive age.  The genes  included in any generation, whether in newly 
formed zygotes  or in offspring that survive to reproduce, are a sample of the genes  carried by the 
previous generation.  Any sample is subject to random variation, or sampling error (2005: 227).
In the subsequent paragraph, Futuyma invokes  indiscriminate parent sampling by giving an example where 
changes in gene frequency in a population of snails  are the result of being squished by cows, a process  in 
which the color of  the snails is causally irrelevant.
 Turning to other popular evolution textbooks, Roughgarden similarly explains  indiscriminate gamete 
sampling in a finite population before asserting, “Genetic drift is  the name for changes  in gene frequency 
caused by this sampling error” (1996: 57-58). And according to Ridley’s discussion of  drift:
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…random changes  in gene frequencies  between generations  are called genetic  drift, random drift, or 
(simply) drift…Genetic drift is  not confined to cases  of selective neutrality. When selection is  acting at 
a locus, random sampling (1) also influences  the change in gene frequencies between generations…
The sampling of gametes  is  only the first stage at which random sampling occurs. It continues  at 
every stage as the adult population of  a new generation grows up (2003: 138-139).
Thus, for all three of these biologists, drift is  indeed partially characterized as  an outcome (a change in gene 
frequencies), but it is  an outcome caused by a certain type of physical process (indiscriminate parent or gamete 
sampling) – not as outcome alone.
 Although it is  not our target here, it can be argued that problems  arise for accounts  of drift which 
incorporate both process  and outcome, as these biologists’ definitions  do; to mention one problem, authors 
usually end up vacillating between drift-as-process  and drift-as-outcome, leading to inconsistencies  (as 
Millstein 2002, 2005 has  argued). Even if it were the common definition among biologists, such definitions 
should not be accepted uncritically. There is  a role for philosophical analysis  in order to achieve, e.g., 
consistency, clarity, and representation of distinct phenomena. Indeed, we write in the spirit of Mills  and 
Beatty (1979), who begin with biologists’ definitions  of fitness but re-evaluate those definitions  in light of 
biological practice (and so honor the implicit use rather than the explicit definition; the use of the term 
“drift” will be discussed further below). Regardless, it seems clear that standard conceptions  of drift 
articulated by biologists are not consistent with the DOA view, since they incorporate drift-as-process.
	 DOA may in fact be the most common definition of drift among philosophers. For example, Pigliucci and 
Kaplan state:
In a case in which the changes  observed are close to the changes  statistically expected for relevantly 
similar populations, we might say that the outcome reflects  our expectations  from predictive 
selection; in a case in which the changes  are more distant from the mean, we might say that the 
outcome does not reflect those expectations  – that is, we might choose to call it an example of drift. 
But that does  not imply that any kind of process took place in the latter population that did not take 
place in the former... It is  worth stressing the conclusion that drift is  not a process  in any meaningful 
sense (Pigliucci and Kaplan 2006: 28-29).
Thus, Pigliucci and Kaplan have seemingly (2) endorsed DOA: drift is  not a process  “in any meaningful 
sense,” but rather, a certain type of outcome (namely, an outcome that deviates  from the expectations  of 
selection).
 However, not all philosophers  endorse DOA; some philosophers  endorse a combined process/outcome 
definition and some endorse our view of drift as  a process. For example, Richardson describes  drift in terms 
of its  outcome alone: “[g]enetic drift is  sometimes  described as  the ‘error’ in the transmission of types  from 
generation to generation, arising from finite population size” (2006: 643). However, Richardson is not 
committed to the view that drift is  purely mathematical, as  the proponents  of DOA are, since he 
characterizes  drift as  causal. Brandon, on the other hand, defines  drift as  “any deviation from the expected 
levels  of reproduction due to sampling error” (2005: 169). He thinks that it “is  surely right to think of 
selection and drift as  processes” but that “the outcomes  are necessary not only to operationalize the 
distinction, but also to make sense of it conceptually” (2005: 169). So, Brandon’s view is  similar to those of 
the biologists described previously, except that he believes “there is a single process, sampling” (2005: 167).
 But just as  one should not uncritically accept standard, textbook conceptions  of drift, one should not 
uncritically accept philosophers’ conceptions  either. There should be some connection to biologists’ 
definitions, even if those definitions are not fully authoritative. The general point is  that any definition, 
whether it derives  from a biologist or a philosopher, must be critically examined and defended. With that 
said, it's clear that DOA can’t be defended either as  the most common definition among contemporary 
biologists  (because it isn’t) or as  the most common definition among philosophers  (it might be, but that 
doesn’t settle the issue without substantive connection to biological practice). As  we argue in what follows, 
biological practice doesn't bear out the DOA view. But first, let’s consider how DOA might be defended.
ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIESDARWIN, C. — ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES
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Examination of  the mathematical models of  drift alone
	 Since DOA cannot be justified by an appeal to common conceptions  among biologists  and philosophers, 
the most charitable interpretation is  that DOA is  in accord with the mathematical models  of drift, although 
it cannot be derived entirely consistently (see Millstein and Skipper 2007 for discussion). But setting concerns 
about consistency aside, one might think DOA is  the most natural understanding of drift based on 
mathematical presentations of drift models  in some population genetics  textbooks. Such presentations  begin 
by specifying the conditions under which gene frequencies  remain unchanged from one generation to the 
next, via the highly idealized Hardy-Weinberg Principle. Then, one by one, the assumptions  underlying the 
Hardy-Weinberg principle are relaxed, e.g., by incorporating fitness  differences (and thus selection), and by 
introducing finite population size. Drift seems to be introduced when finite population size is  introduced, and 
so, one might think that drift is  merely the effect of finite population size, and thus, purely mathematical. 
(This  is  what we mean when we say that DOA proponents  seem to understand drift solely through an 
examination of the mathematical models  in which drift appears). If this  reading of population genetics 
textbooks is right, (3) would it justify DOA?
 We contend that it does not – that mathematics  cannot be the sole basis for interpretation because the 
same equation can be given radically different interpretations, one physical and one not. To see this, 
consider the equation (p + q)2 = p2 + 2pq + q2 = 1. 
	 This equation could be understood as  the Hardy-Weinberg Principle itself. Under this  interpretation, 
the equation represents  an infinite (or very large) sexually reproducing population of diploid organisms 
undergoing random mating; we focus  on one locus  with two alleles, A and a, the former which has a 
frequency p and the latter which has  a frequency q. The values  p2, 2pq, and q2 represent the proportions 
that AA, Aa, and aa will maintain (respectively) in the population from generation to generation, assuming 
that the idealizing assumptions hold.
	 Now consider that the same equation, (p + q)2 = p2 + 2pq + q2 = 1, can have a very different 
interpretation. Suppose we have a square with sides of  length p + q, as follows:
 
There are two ways  to calculate the area of the large square. Most directly, its  area is (p+q)2. But its  area can 
also be calculated as  the sum of the areas  of the four rectangles: p2 + 2pq + q2. And since any length can be 
designated as  1 unit, we can say that the area of the new square is  (p + q)2 = p2 + 2pq + q2 = 1; the same 
equation that is used for the Hardy-Weinberg Principle. Let us call this the “sum of  areas” interpretation.
	 As the Hardy-Weinberg Principle, the equation represents  a physical process: the maintenance of 
genotype frequencies  in a population of randomly mating, sexually reproducing organisms from one 
generation to the next. The physical process  can be represented mathematically, but it is  not purely 
mathematical. As the sum of areas, however, the equation does not represent a physical process.  It is purely 
mathematical; it is  simply a geometrical relationship. Thus, it is a mistake to derive definitions  from 
mathematics  alone, as  DOA seems  to do, since many, very different definitions  can be derived from the same 
equation. Moreover, it is  problematic to think that ontological questions  about the causality (or lack thereof) 
of terms appearing in equations  can be gleaned from the equations alone. On some interpretations, a 
physical process  is  represented, but on others, it is  not. There is no way to tell from the mathematics  alone. 
p2
q2
pq
p
q pq
p
q
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So, one reason that it is  a mistake to think that we can glean definitions  of drift from mathematics  alone, as 
DOA seems to do, is that the same mathematics can give rise to radically different interpretations.  
 This can be recast in more philosophical terms  using the semantic approach to theories. Although the 
semantic approach developed its  analysis  of models  and their interpretation to address  the problem of the 
constitution and structure of theory in science, their account of models  provides  a sophisticated framework 
for understanding exactly the kinds  of mathematical population genetics  models  used to represent drift 
(Lloyd 1988). According to the semantic approach, a model is  a non-linguistic entity that can be represented 
in terms  of variables  and rules  or laws  describing the functions  operating on those variables. The state of the 
model refers  to any particular set of values for the variables in that model. The collection of all of the states 
of the model composes  the model’s  state space. The rules  of a theory describe the possible relationships of 
coexistence, interaction, and temporal succession of the variables  in the model. In doing so they describe 
trajectories  through the state space for that model (Lloyd 1988: 19). One virtue claimed for this  approach to 
understanding models  and theories  is  that it coheres  strongly with the ways in which biologists  understand 
models with biology (Lloyd 1988, Lewontin 1963).
 Models, according to the semantic approach, are always  ideal structures. Interpreting a model, then, 
involves  proposing that certain features  of the model, some or all of variables  and functions, correspond to 
certain features of the world. This claim of empirical correspondence is  then subject to verification and 
refutation.  So, in terms  of the binomial equation, the equation represents  a mathematical model with two 
variables  and a function describing their interaction. One interpretation of this  equation involves  the claim 
that p and q correspond to the frequencies  of two alleles  at a locus; the other interpretation involes  the claim 
that p and q correspond to lengths  of the side of a square. (Of course, there are other possible 
interpretations). The first interpretation is  justified if the model provides  an empirically adequate description 
of the dynamic behavior of two alleles  at a locus  and if the assumptions  made in the model’s  interpretation 
are themselves  justified (Lloyd 1988, Skipper 2000, Dietrich and Skipper 2008). (4) The justification of the 
model’s  interpretation depends  crucially, we claim, on claims about the physical processes  that affect the 
allele frequencies  and their dynamics.  The second interpretation of the equation involves claims  about 
geometric and mathematical relationships  that can be justified by appeal to geometric proof, as  opposed to 
physical correspondence. The equation alone or the model alone does  not carry with it any particular 
interpretation, although it may constrain which interpretations  are possible given the variables  and their 
interaction. Claims about drift are claims  about empirically justified interpretations  of these models. These 
justification depend crucially on our understanding of  underlying physical processes.
 Another reason it is a mistake to think that we can glean definitions  of drift from mathematics  alone is  
that there isn’t just one mathematical model of drift. Rather, there are many different models, each with its 
own mathematical representation and each with its  own biological justification, as  the following discussion 
shows. None are purely mathematical.
 Philosophers  of biology often start discussions  of drift with the simple Wright-Fisher model, the core of 
which is  the binomial distribution. Here, there are assumed to be N diploid adults  in a population, mating 
randomly, with a gene that has  a frequency of p0. Adults make an infinite number of gametes having the 
same allele frequency. From the pool, 2N gametes  are drawn at random to constitute the N diploid 
individuals  for the next generation. The binomial distribution is key. The probability that i A alleles  make it 
to the next generation is  the binomial probability, Prob{i} = [(2N!/i!(2N=i)!]piq2N-i, where i may be 0, 1, …, 
2N, N is  the population size, and p and q are allele frequencies  (and q = 1 - p). The binomial distribution 
describes  the probability of i events  of copying allele A, where the probability of copying an A allele is  p 
over n = 2N (in this case) independent trials.
	 The Wright-Fisher model is  a simple and elegant model of the central statistical features of drift, i.e., the 
mean and variance of p' and the change in heterozygosity, H. But, as  John Gillespie (2004: 49) has  aptly 
pointed out: "its  biological underpinnings  can make us  queasy." (5) He continues, "populations do not 
reproduce by calling in their local statistician and asking her to pick exactly 2N gametes at random (with 
replacement) and toss  them into the next generation" (p. 49). Differently put, drift (the physical process) is 
not a binomial sampling process. 
 There are other ways  of mathematically modeling drift. Since we have already invoked Gillespie, 
consider his  general model of drift (2004: 49-51). Assume a diploid population of N members  and a two-
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allele locus, A1 and A2 at frequencies  p and q = (1 – p). Say the population mates at random. In this  case, 
each of the 2Np A1 gametes  will make up the next generation with a random number of offspring gametes. 
Let the random variable Xi represent the number of offspring gametes  from the ith A1 gamete and Yi 
represents  the number from the ith A1 gamete. Xi and Yi may take values  0, 1, 2, and so on. The total 
number of A1 alleles  in the next generation may be written as  the random variable X = X1 + X2 + … + 
X2NP. Similarly for Y. The allele frequency in the next generation is  the random variable p' = X/X+Y, i.e., 
the number of A1 gametes  in the next generation divided by the total number of gametes. There is  no 
restriction on the distribution of  the numbers of  offspring nor on the total number of  offspring gametes.
	 Gillespie's  generalized model, like the Wright-Fisher model, captures  the core statistical features  of drift, 
the mean and variance of p' and the change in heterozygosity, H. The difference is  that the generalized 
model is  not tied to binomial sampling. Rather than a population calling in the local statistician, Gillespie's 
generalized model reflects, in a biologically more realistic way than the Wright-Fisher model, that 
"individuals find mates, have babies, babies survive to reproduce, etc." (p. 49).
	 Our point here is  this: There are numerous  mathematical models  of drift. Taking any one model as 
central to understanding drift takes  us  in one of many interpretive directions. The Wright-Fisher model sees 
drift as  a binomial sampling process, whereas  Gillespie's  general model is  not so constrained. If we consider 
as  well other models of drift, such as  the Moran model, the Cannings model, or the coalescent, then other 
interpretations  are sure to result. The varying interpretive directions are guided mainly by the assumptions 
embedded in the model. For example, the Wright-Fisher model assumes  that all the alleles  at each locus 
disaggregate and are sampled randomly. This  central assumption of the model belies  the fact that alleles are 
linked together in chromosomes. In fact, taking such linkage into account might, as  it did Gillespie, lead one 
away from drift as an explanation of decreases in heterozygosity and toward random effects of linked 
selection (Skipper 2006).
	 It is  not clear whether there is  any particular reason to choose one drift model over another in trying to 
understand  the concept of drift, though there may be other reasons  to choose a particular model (e.g., 
tractability). All mathematical models  of drift make simplifying assumptions  that belie biological reality; a 
biologically realistic model is  surely practically impossible.  So, conceptually reifying simplistic models  will 
either lead to strange claims  about what sort of process  drift is  (e.g., binomial sampling) or false claims  that 
all there is  to understanding drift is  outcomes.  More specifically, DOA treats  drift and flips  of a coin as 
though they were perfectly analogous.  However, that is  only true on the Wright-Fisher model, where drift is 
modeled as  binomial sampling.  And the motivations behind the alternative models  are baffling for the DOA 
view.  Gillespie, for example, is seeking a model with more realistic biological assumptions about drift; this makes no sense if 
drift were only a statistical outcome.
 None of this  is  to say that examining mathematical models  of drift plays  no role in our understanding of 
what drift is. Rather, it is  to say that models themselves  are not the ultimate resource. The interpretation of 
models  is a matter of synthesizing theoretical, data, and experimental models. That is, interpreting models 
really means  bringing in assumptions  about the system that is  being modeled. After all, models  are, as  Giere 
(1988) so clearly points  out, built as representations of specific aspects  of physical systems. In that sense, 
interpreting models  means  making the assumptions about how the model is  constructed plain. Indeed, 
interpretation isn't a matter of deriving the properties  of a modeled system from the model. To be sure, we 
want our population genetics  models  to give us  measurements  we can use – the mean and variance of p', for 
example. But those measurements  don't then exhaust the system being modeled. What we are measuring 
and how we think we can do so with some specific model must be spelled out. And that invariably involves 
bringing in metaphysical (causal) assumptions  (among others) about the real world system being modeled. 
The process of relating models  to data (through an examination of theoretical, data, and experimental 
models) is  then meant to bear out the (homomorphic) relationship between model and real world systems. As 
we will argue in the next section, when we model drift, we model indiscriminate sampling processes  and, so, 
a proper conception of  drift requires a consideration of  those processes.
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Consideration of  historical and contemporary biological practice
 Examination of the first articulations  of a term allow us  to answer the questions, “What was  the original 
purpose of this  term? What was  its  role in theory and in practice? In particular, was  the term intended to 
represent a physical phenomenon or was its role purely mathematical?”
	 The first mentions  of "drift" can be traced to Sewall Wright and R. A. Fisher, although neither claimed 
to have developed the idea behind drift; Fisher first discussed the idea in his  discussion of the writings  of 
A.C. and A. L. Hagedoorn (1921), whereas  Wright (1951) credits  Gulick (1872) rather than the Hagedoorns 
(see Beatty 1992 for discussion).  Moreover, it is  fair to say that Wright and Fisher are jointly responsible for 
the first mathematical models  of drift in population genetics. (6) Thus, they are the central figures to 
consider in deciding whether drift was  intended to be purely mathematical or representative of a physical 
process.
 What the following three quotes  will show is that Fisher and Wright indeed intended for “drift” to 
represent a physical process. More specifically, they saw drift as  an indiscriminate sampling process  (as 
described earlier).
(i). Fisher (1921) invokes drift as indiscriminate parent sampling. Note also that the phenomenon itself is 
taken to occur regardless  of the size of the population, although the speed of its  effect varies with the 
population size:
[The Hagedoorns] believe that the random selection of individuals  to become the parents of the 
next generation is  a more important factor in reducing the variability of a species  than is  the natural 
selection of advantageous  characters. The whole question is worthy of a thorough discussion, but 
the authors  evidently lack the statistical knowledge necessary for its  adequate treatment. By taking 
simple examples  of species  of only two or three individuals it is  easy to show that by random selection 
the variability will be rapidly reduced. It by no means  follows  that the reduction will be equally rapid 
in an interbreeding group of  2 or 3 million individuals (pp. 467-8; emphasis in original).
(ii). Wright (1932) describes  drift as  both indiscriminate parent sampling and indiscriminate gamete 
sampling; again, the physical phenomenon is  seen as producing a certain kind of effect (a change in gene 
frequency from one generation to the next): 
If the population is  not indefinitely large, another factor must be taken into account: the effects  of 
accidents  of sampling among those that survive and become parents  in each generation and among 
the germ cells  of these…Gene frequency in a given generation is  in general a little different one way 
or the other from that in the preceding, merely by chance (p. 360)
(iii). Fisher and Ford (1947) discuss  drift as  indiscriminate gamete sampling; once again, the strength of the 
effect (but not the occurrence of  the phenomenon) depends on population size:
Great evolutionary importance has  been attached by Sewell [sic] Wright (l93l, 1932, 1935, 1940) to 
the fact that small shifts  in the gene-ratios  of all segregating factors  will occur from generation to 
generation owing to the errors  of random sampling in the process  by which the gametes available in 
any one generation are chosen to constitute the next. Such chance deviations  will, of course, be 
greater the smaller the isolated population concerned (p. 167).
These quotes  are only three among the many that we could display; see also, e.g., Fisher (1922ab) and 
Wright (1931, 1937, 1948). All three point to the same conclusion: the biologists who developed the mathematical 
models of drift did so with the intention of modeling physical processes (the indiscriminate sampling processes) that they took to 
be occurring in nature. It might be argued that, as  with the definitions of contemporary biologists, Fisher’s  and 
Wright’s  definitions invoke both process and outcome; again, we would suggest that such definitions not be 
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accepted uncritically. But even if the best definition of drift were to combine process  with outcome, it would 
still provide no support for DOA and the claim that drift is  purely mathematical. The drift models  were not 
intended simply to incorporate the mathematical consequences  of finite population size, as  the proponents 
of DOA would have us  believe; population size does have a role to play, but only in determining the strength 
and speed of  the effect of  the indiscriminate sampling processes being modeled. 
 Just to be clear, it is  not our contention that Fisher and Wright consistently used the term “drift” to 
represent indiscriminate sampling processes. Wright in particular became quite expansive in the use of the 
term, sometimes conflating it with inbreeding, a distinct biological phenomenon that is  also connected to 
small population size. Another notorious  expansion was  to consider fluctuations  in mutation rate, 
fluctuations in migration, and fluctuations  in selection to be drift (Wright 1955). In response, Cain and 
Currey (1963) justifiably noted “[w]hatever may be the conveniences  for mathematical geneticists  of 
considering together all processes  regarded as  random, irrespective of their biological significance, the 
worker on actual examples must classify processes according to their biological significance” (Cain and 
Currey 1963: 59). Furthermore, they asserted, “in practice the lumping of ‘random’ processes  prevents  the 
proper analysis of actual situations...Such confusions  can only lead to erroneous general conclusions about 
the relative importance of selection, sampling error, mutation and other factors” (Cain and Currey 1963: 
59). Because “[s]ampling error is  biologically a very different phenomenon from selection, and as  Wright has 
declared that ‘genetic drift’ must have a wider connotation, we propose to refer to the effects  of sampling 
error as  sampling drift” (Cain and Currey 1963: 59). Wright appears to have agreed, at least in part; for 
example, he uses  the term “sampling drift” in his  1978 magnum opus, Evolution and the Genetics of Populations. 
In short, although we can understand the reasons why Wright expanded his  use of the term drift – 
fluctuations in selection, mutation, and migration could play the same role as  indiscriminate sampling in 
Wright’s  shifting balance model, and that was  his  primary concern – that does  not imply that the expansion 
was  justified. In any case, note that even as  an expanded term, drift still represents  physical (biological) 
processes, not merely mathematical constructs as DOA proponents contend.
 Nor is  it our contention that “drift represents  biological processes just because Wright and Fisher said 
that they did,” although we are claiming the first uses  of a term are relevant to its  understanding. We are 
also claiming that Wright and Fisher had good reason to think that there were biological processes  in nature 
that needed to be represented in drift models in order to better track evolutionary changes in a population.
 Plutynski (2007) has  suggested that the history of the use of the term “drift” is  too varied (she calls it a 
“catchall term”) to draw any definitive philosophical conclusions about how it ought to be used. We don’t 
have any substantive disagreements  with her presentations of the views  of Wright, Fisher, et al., but we think 
she has overstated the variety of meanings. It is  true that drift has  been used to describe processes  at 
different levels  of organization (gametes  and organisms, for example), (7) but many of these can be 
construed as  indiscriminate sampling. That is, indiscriminate gamete sampling and indiscriminate organism 
(or “parent”) sampling are both forms of drift. We contend (taking our historians’ hats  off for a moment and 
putting our philosophers’ hats  on) that those uses  that cannot be construed as  indiscriminate sampling 
describe different biological processes and thus  ought to be referred to by different terms, as  Cain and Currey 
suggested.
 One might object that we are interpreting Fisher and Wright incorrectly. But we don't think they would 
make such a claim. In fact, we think their own understanding of the relationship between their quantitative 
and qualitative evolutionary theories  is  just more evidence not only that our interpretations are correct, but 
that they took themselves  to be arguing over the processes  of evolution — especially drift and its  role among 
them — as opposed to the models themselves.
	 In 1930, Fisher's  The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection was  published, and Wright had submitted for 
review his  famous  1931 paper, "Evolution in Mendelian Populations," to Genetics. Wright was  also invited to 
write a review of Fisher's book for The Journal of Heredity. During the months  of 1930, Fisher and Wright 
corresponded about the details of their quantitative theories. Each was  concerned to bring their alternative 
mathematical approaches  into agreement. By October, they managed to do so. But that reconciliation did 
nothing to quell what Fisher and Wright considered their more substantive disagreement, which was  over 
their qualitative evolutionary theories. On October 15, 1930, Wright wrote:
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…there is  now no mathematical difference between our results  in the cases  which can be compared. 
I have discussed [in the review of Fisher's  book] at some length the rather different interpretations  of 
the role of selection which we have reached and will be much interested in getting your criticism of 
my view. (Wright to Fisher, October 15, 1930, in Provine 1986: 265).
The "rather different interpretations" that Wright is  talking about concern, mainly, the implications  for the 
role of certain evolutionary processes  given his  and Fisher's  alternative assumptions  about population size. 
According to Wright, Fisher's  assumption that populations  are large enough to ignore "the effects  of random 
sampling of gametes" leads to a too-slow evolutionary process. That is, selection and mutation alone are too 
slow in geologic time to yield the cumulative evolution observed. Wright famously believed that a global 
population subdivided into semi-isolated, intermediate-sized populations  would yield a correct evolutionary 
tempo because indiscriminate gamete sampling would increase the amount of genetic variation on which 
selection could act and migration would transport favorable adaptations  through the global population via 
migration (Wright 1930: 354).
 Wright took pains  in his 1931 paper to make plain the biological weaknesses  of the quantitative 
approach to evolution. Indeed, he devoted an entire section of his  1931 paper to laying out and justifying his 
qualitative interpretation of his quantitative views, clarifying what he took to be the "factors" of genetic 
homogeneity and heterogeneity in evolution and then analyzed their roles  and effects  qualitatively. Perhaps 
his  most famous  such qualitative discussion of his  evolutionary theory is  in his  1932 adaptive landscape 
paper, in which he is  concerned to articulate the "mechanism by which the species  may continually find its 
way from lower to higher" adaptive peaks on the multidimensional surface of selective value. Drift –"a trial 
and error mechanism"—was key to this articulation (Wright 1932: 359).
	 Wright and Fisher famously disagreed about, among other things, the role of drift in the evolutionary 
process. But we think it's  fair to say that Fisher agreed with Wright that relating their quantitative models  to 
their qualitative views  of the evolutionary process  was  crucial to understanding evolution. In response to 
Wright's October 15, 1930 letter, Fisher wrote:
Mathematicians always tend to assume that the hardest mathematics will be the most important, 
and this  is  perhaps  true enough in the well worn topics. It is  certainly not true of my [1930] book, 
where the apparently non-mathematically parts, where I have left the mathematics  undone, are often 
of the greatest ultimate interest. (Fisher to Wright, October 25, 1930, in Provine 1986: 266, 
emphasis in original).
Comparatively, Wright was much more concerned with making the differences between his  quantitative and 
qualitative evolutionary theories  clear in print than Fisher. But Fisher's  letter to Wright is  certainly useful for 
sorting out how to approach conceptual questions  in population genetics. Working through all that makes  up 
the controversies  between Fisher and Wright surely bears  this  conclusion out (Provine 1986; Skipper 2002, 
2009).
 So, DOA does  not accord with the early history of evolutionary genetics, despite claims  to the contrary 
(Walsh 2007). This  is  not necessarily problematic; terms do change over time. But it's  worth paying attention 
to the origins, nonetheless; often terms retain shades  of the original meanings  for many practitioners, even 
when these are not explicit.  And changes  in terms  may not have been for the better; sometimes  the original 
definition is  the clearest and most consistent. This  seems  to be true of many of Darwin’s  definitions, for 
example.  But what we want to suggest here is that not only must we pay attention to the first mentions  of a 
term, but also, we must consider the contemporary uses of the term (as  distinguished from biologists’ stated 
definitions  that we discussed earlier).  As  we will show, DOA does  not accord with contemporary usage 
either.
 It is  important to keep in mind that in the history of population genetics  modeling, drift models  have 
played an important role as  simplified cases – cases  that are mathematically tractable but not thought to 
correspond to natural systems  of alleles. For modelers in stochastic population genetics, starting with the 
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simplest mathematical case and adding complexity is  common practice. Indeed in their now classic, An 
Introduction to Population Genetics Theory, James  Crow and Motoo Kimura explicitly structure their chapter on 
stochastic processes  with the simplest case of drift at the beginning and fluctuating selection intensities at the 
end (Crow and Kimura 1970). However, with the rise of Molecular Population Genetics  in the 1960s, these 
mathematically tractable drift models  were transformed from simplest cases  to descriptions  of real processes 
describing real systems of  amino acid and nucleotide substitutions.
 Consider the specific case of the Infinite Alleles Model created by Crow and Kimura in the early 1960s 
(Kimura and Crow 1964). Crow and Kimura created the Infinite Alleles  model because they wanted to 
address  the proportion of overdominant loci that could be maintained in a population (Crow 1989; Dietrich 
1994, 2006). Their goal was to argue against advocates of the Balance Position in evolutionary genetics  who 
claimed that large numbers  of heterozygous  combinations were maintained in natural populations. To 
model this  situation, Crow first assumed that every mutation was  a mutation to a new allele (hence the 
nearly infinite number of alleles  that give the model its  name). Then Kimura first solved the diffusion 
equations  for the case of neutrality, where there was no selection or s=0. This  model was  then made more 
complex by adding selection, but even then simplifying assumptions  about selective values were made in 
order to make “the mathematics  more manageable” (Kimura and Crow 1964: 728). Kimura and Crow note 
that this  model is  “unrealistic,” yet they use it because in their words, “It can help provide some insight as  to 
what situations are possible or likely in a natural population.” More specifically, the case of drift establishes 
the maximum heterozygosity per locus  and provides  a point of contrast for the effects  of different forms of 
selection on heterozygosity. Nowhere in this  paper do Kimura and Crow argue that there are neutral alleles 
in nature or that drift is  a predominant force in nature. By 1968, however, Kimura had become convinced 
that this  simplest mathematical case was  in fact representative of the observed polymorphisms  in natural 
populations. Kimura was  not moved to reify neutral alleles  and drift based on their role in stochastic 
population genetics  models. Rather this  shift was motivated by a variety of evidence from comparative 
biochemistry, including data on rate of molecular change, which would create an intolerable genetic load 
unless  many mutants  were neutral, the redundancy of the genetic code, which created synonymous 
mutations  with no known selective effect, the constant molecular rate of change, which could not be 
explained by selection, to name only a few of the arguments. While the neutral theory was  controversial, the 
point here is  that the decision to advocate random genetic drift as  a significant, naturally occurring biological process 
was  supported by multiple lines  of evidence, independent of how those processes  were modeled or 
compared to selective processes.
  In his  general discussions of drift and stochastic population genetics  models, Kimura clearly indicates 
that he believes  that the patterns  of randomly changing gene frequencies  are the result of either a process  of 
random gamete sampling or a process  of the random fluctuation of selection intensities  (Kimura 1964, 
Crow and Kimura 1964). In doing so, he places  himself in a tradition of modeling that he traces  to Wright. 
One way of thinking about Kimura’s  decision to advocate the neutral theory is  that he believed that he had 
new physical evidence for the importance of the process  of random gamete sampling on changes in 
molecular sequences. DOA fails  to account for the way Kimura arrived at this conclusion; in particular, it 
fails  to account for Kimura’s  shift to a realist’s  understanding of his  drift models. It also fails  to account for 
Kimura’s  use of biochemical data as  evidence for indiscriminate sampling; if drift were only deviation from 
selection expectations, this evidence would be irrelevant and unneeded.
 In short, neither the early nor the more recent history of population genetics  supports  the DOA view. 
Indeed, DOA is  not only inconsistent with original and more recent conceptions  of drift, DOA distorts  how 
biologists  in practice have reasoned about the process. In addition, the discussion in the present section 
amplifies  our argument of the previous section – mathematical models  are not the ultimate resource in 
understanding biological concepts, particularly drift.
Conclusion
 Our conclusions  pertain to the interpretation of models  in general as  well as  the interpretation of drift 
models  in particular. With respect to the interpretation of models  in general, we have used the case of drift 
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to try to show that when one is interpreting models, it is  a mistake to rely solely on scientists’ and 
philosophers’ stated definitions (in any case, both scientists  and philosophers  often disagree amongst 
themselves) and a mistake to rely solely on mathematics, the latter mistake being the one that proponents  of 
DOA seem to commit. In particular, examination of the mathematics  alone cannot tell us  whether the terms 
referred to in the model are purely mathematical or whether they represent physical processes. Instead, we 
have argued that when interpreting mathematical models, one needs  to take into account the original 
purpose for which the model was  developed (what it was  taken to represent) as  well as  its  contemporary uses, 
together with criteria such as  clarity and consistency. Our position on interpreting mathematical models 
echoes views articulated by other philosophers of  science such as Ron Giere, Paul Humphreys and others. 
	 With respect to the interpretation of drift models  in particular, we have argued that the DOA view of 
drift, with its  reliance on mathematical models  alone, fails  to yield a proper conceptualization of drift. We 
have tried to establish this conclusion by showing how simply relying on models  can take us down wrong 
interpretive paths  and by examining historical and contemporary biological practice. Indeed, we believe that 
our argument goes  some distance toward establishing the positive claim that drift is  best understood by 
looking not at mathematical models  alone, but at those models  in relation to the physical processes  being 
modeled, namely the various indiscriminate sampling processes.
 When one takes  first usage and contemporary biological practice into account, starting with the 
motivation for Wright’s  and Fisher’s  early drift models  and ending with Kimura’s  neutral theory, a very 
different picture of the concept of drift emerges. On this  view, drift is a term designating a set of physical 
processes, arguably, indiscriminate sampling processes  (Beatty 1984; Hodge 1987; Millstein 2002, 2005; 
Millstein and Skipper 2007, Dietrich and Millstein 2008). Drift is not a purely mathematical outcome. 
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NOTES
(1) Authors  often use the term “random sampling” rather than “indiscriminate sampling,” but given the many 
connotations of the word “random”, we think “indiscriminate” better captures  the intended meaning.  We will use this 
interpretation throughout the subsequent discussion.
(2) Pigliucci and Kaplan (personal communication) say that they did not intend to endorse DOA, but rather that they 
think that drift is caused by indiscriminate sampling as well as various random events  at the level of individuals..  Their 
view is different from DOA, they contend, in that they think “drift” can refer either to the difference between the actual 
changes  in a population and those changes that would be predicted from the differences  in fitness or to the degree of 
‘scatter’  around the (expected) mean changes  in the population (the shape and size of the distribution).  Perhaps this 
might be seen as a variant of  DOA.
(3) As suggested by our discussion above, our view is  that such readings are highly selective, ignoring discussions  of 
indiscriminate sampling.
(4) The range of standards used in the evaluation of models  and theories  is  presented in Skipper (2000) and Dietrich 
and Skipper (2008).
(5) Ewens (2004) makes a similar point.
(6) Of  course, what they famously disagreed about was the type and extent of  the role of  drift, among other things.
(7) Selection, of  course, has similarly been described as occurring at many levels of  organization.
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